Family Policy in France by Fagnani, Jeanne
Family Policy in France
Jeanne Fagnani
To cite this version:
Jeanne Fagnani. Family Policy in France. Tony Fitzpatrick, Huck-ju Kwon, Nick Manning,
James Midgley, and Gillian Pascall. International Encyclopedia of Social Policy, 3, Routledge,
pp.501-506, 2006. <halshs-00101703>
HAL Id: halshs-00101703
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00101703
Submitted on 27 Sep 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Family Policy in France 
Jeanne Fagnani 
Publié dans “International Encyclopedia of Social Policy”, Routledge, Vol. 3, 2006, pp. 501-506. 
 
The French welfare state is a mixed system combining elements of various organizational 
models: it lies between the Beveridge and Bismarck models, with insurance funds and 
strong state intervention, and relies both on wage related contributions and general 
taxation. In the health sector for instance, it combines public and complementary 
voluntary health insurance, which finance the same services by the same providers for the 
same populations. It is a publicly funded system characterized by freedom of choice and 
unrestricted access for patients along with freedom of practice for professionals. These 
factors combine to make it difficult for the state to control expenditure, taking into 
account that health insurance funds have no real financial responsibility. 
The present social security system, including statutory health insurance, officially came 
into being with the Ordinance of 4 October 1945 which aimed to cover all the so-called 
‘social risks’. A reform of the organization of social security took place in 1967. It was 
separated into four branches: health insurance (which represents the largest share of 
expenditures devoted to social protection), pensions, family allowances, and insurance 
for work-related accidents and occupational illnesses. The provision of social security 
was aimed primarily at workers and their families. The principle of expanding coverage 
to the whole population was put into practice only in stages.  
The founders of the social security system, inspired by the Beveridge report, wanted to 
create a single system guaranteeing uniform rights for all. However, this goal could not 
be achieved due to opposition from certain socio-professional groups who already 
benefited from insurance coverage that had more favourable terms and who succeeded in 
maintaining their particular schemes (civil servants, in particular). Therefore, the social 
security system is characterized by a high degree of occupational fragmentation while the 
largest scheme covers private sector employees. 
 
Management of the boards of health insurance funds has traditionally been shared 
between the state and the “social partners” (representatives of employees and employers 
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appointed by trade unions). With the funds running ever increasing deficits throughout 
the nineties this balance has been shifting towards increasing state intervention, 
particularly since the issue of cost-containment has figured prominently on the political 
agenda. However, many of the measures taken to reduce expenditure growth have so far 
been ineffective and have always been strongly opposed by professional associations. 
Against a background of slow economic growth and spreading unemployment, the health 
system has undergone significant changes: one of the most important took place in 2000 
in the form of the Universal Health Coverage Act (CMU) which establishes universal 
health coverage on the basis of residence in France. The CMU Act further shifted the 
balance of the insurance system away from a work-based system. The objective of 
equality has prevailed over cost containment as the CMU explicitly aims to increase 
access for people on low incomes who are exempt from paying contributions. 
This evolution has its origins in the reform of 1996 (‘Juppé reform’ named after the 
Prime Minister of the time) which introduced two important changes: the creation of a tax 
on income in the funding of the social security system and a more active role for 
parliament in determining policy directions and expenditure targets in each branch of the 
system. 
The pension branch also underwent significant changes: in 1993, the Government 
decided  on a reduction of benefits in the scheme covering private sector employees. Two 
years later, an attempt at cutting pensions for public sector employees resulted in a 
massive protest movement which forced the right-wing Government to withdraw their 
plans. Under the pressure of workers’ trade unions, the Government also set up an ‘Old 
Age Solidarity Fund’, financed through general taxation. This fund has since taken on the 
financial responsibility for providing minimum pensions and non-contributory means-
tested benefits. 
 
Contrary to the pension system, the family policy branch of the Social security system 
has been immune to cutbacks in provision and no retrenchment measures have been 
implemented. This mirrors the salience of family-related issues in the social and political 
agenda. This also reflects the fact that the family branch and its large network of Local 
Allowance Funds (CAFs) are responsible for the management of welfare state provisions. 
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The family branch is a transfer-heavy system which aims at reducing social inequalities 
and fighting against poverty: for instance they provide more than one million households 
with the *Minimum Income Benefit (RMI) introduced in 1988.  It also provides families 
with a rich array of universal cash benefits which aim to lighten the financial burden for 
families irrespective of their income. These measures are successful in reducing the 
poverty rate among families, in particular lone parent families. Despite the dramatic 
increase since the nineties in the number of welfare recipients, no real welfare-to-work 
programmes have been adopted contrary to the UK. 
France has a long-standing and ‘explicit’ family policy that is overseen by government 
institutions and the subject of official reports produced annually. The ‘family’ as such is 
legally recognised as an institution that plays an important role in the maintenance of 
social cohesion. The appointment of a Minister responsible for family issues further 
demonstrates the importance given to this issue.  
The principal institution in charge of family policy is the National Family Allowance 
Fund (CNAF), which covers around 90 per cent of all recipient families. Theoretically, 
the social partners (including family organizations) represented on the Executive Board 
of the CNAF periodically determine the orientations for intervention in family policy. In 
practice, decisions are made by the Government, whether approved or not by the 
Executive Board. It is solely at the local level that the Executive Boards of the CAFs 
have any real decision-making power, and in particular, a margin for manoeuvre in the 
provision and development of childcare services.  
The resources allocated to the Family branch of Social Security continue to remain close 
to the European average. In the eighties, more than 90 per cent of the resources allocated 
to the family sector were provided by contributions paid by employers. Over the last 
decade, the funding structure has undergone a profound transformation with an increase 
in the proportion represented by state budget spending. 
 
*Family allowances (corresponding to *Child Benefit), extended in 1932 to all salaried 
workers, represent the main cash benefit scheme. A law passed in 1975 extended its 
payment to all families: parents no longer needed to be in work, thus breaking with the 
principle of work-related benefits. Family allowances are not income-related and not 
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taxable. In accordance with a long-standing historical natalist approach, and despite 
constant demands from family organisations, families with only one child are denied 
*family allowances. However, in line with one of the goals of family policy to reduce 
child poverty, families with one child are entitled to a separate means-tested benefit if the 
child is aged under three years.  
 
Family policy still bears clear traces of earlier history: its system of income transfers 
(family allowances and tax concessions through the ‘quotient familial’) follows a long-
established natalist and family centred tradition and continues to favour large families 
(defined as those with three or more children). One of its main objectives is to partly 
compensate for the financial cost of having children. Tax law favours couples, whether 
married or not, with children. The aim is horizontal redistribution (from those with no 
children to those with children), an objective still supported by numerous politicians at 
both ends of the political spectrum. The ‘quotient familial’ operates as follows: within 
this family-based splitting system, the number of children is taken into account in 
calculating the tax liability, the total household income is divided by the number of 
family members, the relevant and progressive tax rate is applied to this income per adult 
equivalent (one ‘share’ for an adult, one ‘half-share’ for the first and second children, one 
‘share’ for the third and subsequent children), and the resultant sum then multiplied by 
the number of family members.  At the same income level, a family with three children 
will pay less than a family with only one child. This tax system is frequently subject to 
criticism by trade-unions and leftist political parties arguing that it should be limited to 
vertical redistribution, like in Sweden. 
 
Family issues are addressed in many areas of public action, one noteworthy example 
being in the public transportation system where large families are provided with special 
reduced fares.  Against the background of an increase in mothers’ labour force 
participation, the work/life balance as an issue has gained increasing salience in political 
life and has come to the forefront of the social policy agenda. Boundaries between state, 
families, and market have been redrawn, evidence that the progressive entry of women 
into the workforce has been a driver for change in the French *welfare regime. 
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 In the post-war years, the legislators were very much concerned about the high infant 
mortality rate. In order to encourage mothers to stay at home, couples with at least two 
children were offered  financial  incentives in the form of the ‘Allocation de Salaire 
Unique’ (Single Salary Allowance). Until the 1960s, France promoted the *’male 
breadwinner’ model through generous assistance to families where only the man was in 
paid work. However, from the seventies onwards, women’s organisations played a 
significant role in demands for public child care facilities and services.  Against this 
background, political actors were inclined to win women’s votes on the basis of their 
support for child care provision. In the context of an acute labour shortage (there was a 
growing demand for qualified women to occupy jobs in the tertiary sector) policy-makers 
became increasingly receptive to the arguments of early childhood specialists in favour of 
crèches: local Family Allowance Funds obtained additional funding to take partial 
responsibility for the running costs of public childcare services, including crèches, and to 
improve the quality of care for infants and young children. 
 At the same time, legislators took a further decisive step with the creation of a childcare 
allowance for families where the mother worked outside the home. This decision was 
particularly symbolic in that it also decreed that the Single Salary Allowance would 
henceforth only be granted to low-income families. Within this context, crèches, 
recreational centres, and holiday camps for employees’ children were also organised by 
several companies at the instigation of their respective Works Committees.  
 
In the second half of the 1970s the rise in the number of crèche places and the increasing 
attendance of young children at nursery school (‘école maternelle’) finally gave a 
decisive impetus to policies that were beginning to integrate the ‘working mother’ model.  
The 1977 law allowed registered ‘childminders’, restricted until then by the vagueness 
and ambiguity of their positions, access to proper employee status and its associated 
rights. This law also marked the first steps leading to social recognition of the importance 
of the quality of childcare;  
Militant action and information campaigns organised by the National Association of 
Nursery Nurses, doctors in the Protection Maternelle et Infantile (a statutory service 
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responsible for health care of children aged under six years and supervising crèches and 
registered childminders) and psychologists were beginning to bear fruit. The early 
socialisation of young children was promoted by stressing that crèches were an ‘ideal’ 
preparation for entry into nursery school. When the Left came to power at the beginning 
of the 1980s, trade unionists and political decision-makers spoke increasingly of the need 
to develop a childcare policy to assist ‘mothers’ to combine work and family life. The 
progressive construction of policy orientated towards working parents interacted with the 
change in women’s attitudes vis-à-vis paid work in a snowball effect that resulted in a 
rise in the number of working mothers.  
 
The existence of the ‘école maternelle’, an institution created in the late nineteenth 
century under the Third Republic, added to the growing movement in favour of shared 
public responsibility for young children. Nearly a third of children aged under three and 
100 per cent of those aged three to six now attend this free, full-day école maternelle. The 
presence of canteens and out-of-school-hours care centres have enabled more mothers to 
work full-time. Furthermore, local authorities have considerably developed recreational 
activities to keep schoolchildren occupied on lesson free Wednesday afternoons, or after 
school, using financial assistance from the local CAFs.  
Since the beginning of the nineties, the changes associated with increasing flexibility at 
the workplace have led to rising demand for ‘flexible’ forms of child care arrangements. 
In the context of rising unemployment, the government therefore decided, in 1994, to 
exploit the job-creating potential of the childcare sector, and to dramatically increase both 
child care allowances and special tax breaks to help families to meet the costs of 
'individualised' child care arrangements (childminders and home helps); the government 
hoped to encourage families with young children to create employment and at the same 
time to bring more domestic workers into the formal economy. Adopting the rhetoric of 
‘free choice for parents’, and of 'diversification of childcare arrangements', successive 
governments have begun to use family policy as a tool to fight unemployment.  
Therefore, the government also decided in 1994 to encourage economically active 
parents, in reality mothers, having a second child to opt for 'staying-at-home' after the 
maternity leave by providing them with an Allocation Parentale d'Education (APE, Child 
 6
Rearing Benefit), a flat-rate benefit, on the condition that they stop working or work only 
on a part-time basis until the child reaches the age of three. To be eligible for this benefit, 
parents are required to have worked or have been registered as unemployed before the 
birth. Despite a gender-neutral discourse, 98 per cent of beneficiaries are women.  
This scheme has been successful among low paid or low qualified mothers. This current 
situation bears witness to the ambiguities of family policy; measures geared at working 
parents are being implemented alongside incentives for mothers to stop working for a 
certain period of time, at least until the child is three years old. As a result, since the 
nineties, the increase in funds allocated by the CNAF towards crèches has been modest 
when compared with the much higher funding allocated to childcare carried out by 
individuals and to the APE. 
 
Nevertheless, unlike Germany, the UK or the Netherlands, it is currently quite socially 
acceptable for a child under three years of age to be taken care of in public day care 
facilities for the whole day while his/her parents are at work. Early socialisation is even 
considered to be of great value, particularly by the educated middle classes. In total, in 
dual-earner families, approximately seven out of ten children under three years of age 
attend either a crèche or nursery school or are the subject of subsidised childcare, whether 
this be a paid childminder or help in their own home or one of the two parents receiving 
the Child Rearing Benefit. All these figures are already beyond the targets for 2010 that 
were set at the European Summit of Barcelona held in 2002. 
This large range of policies and schemes in favour of the work/life balance enables a 
better understanding of differences in mothers’ labour force participation between 
European countries. France, along with Scandinavian countries, has one of the highest 
activity rates for women with children, whereas in the UK, Germany or the Netherlands, 
one-and-a-half earner households are the current norm. In France, among the majority of 
dual-earner couples with children, both partners work full-time. 
 
For both economic reasons and as a result of the struggles by the women’s movement, 
family policy has progressively integrated the ‘working mother model’ and the range of 
measures to help working parents has recently been expanded yet again.  Public 
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expenditures in favour of the development of child care arrangements and parental leaves 
have dramatically increased over the last two decades. Despite the slowdown in its 
expansion, the system of public crèches has not faced funding cutbacks. On the other 
hand, the progressive introduction of measures and schemes to support ‘working 
mothers’ and the modernisation of child rearing norms have coalesced to justify in the 
eyes of couples, and more particularly women, both having children and being present on 
the labour market.  
 
Recently under the socialist government, a serious attempt to change the gender division 
of care within families was made; This resulted in the decision to extend *paternity leave 
(paid at full rate under a certain ceiling by health insurance) from three to fourteen days 
from 2002. However, research has provided evidence that policies governments have 
been introducing since the eighties still fall short of a strong gender-egalitarian approach.  
And because of intimate links to employment policy, policies aimed at helping working 
parents are torn between the political will to promote gender equality at the workplace 
and the need to fight unemployment. The increase in means-tested benefits also mirrors 
the growing concern over social inequalities. As a result, criticisms of complexity and 
lack of clarity are more and more frequent. Corporatism and conflicting interests explain 
why successive government attempts to simplify the family benefit system have resulted 
in only piecemeal measures which have reinforced rather than reduced complexity. As a 
result, French family policy is often qualified as ‘a swarm of bats’. 
 
Significant shifts have occurred over the last three decades, in particular since the 
beginning of the nineties, in the area of maternal employment support, but family policy 
has become too complex and is still fluctuating between different and sometimes 
antagonistic objectives, a phenomenon which weakens its efficiency and corrodes its 
social legitimacy.   
 
See also: child support services; familialization; feminism; paternity and parental leave; 
male breadwinner model; gender discrimination; sexual division of labor; welfare state 
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